The explainable medical coding task aims to automatically assign International Classification of Diseases (ICD) codes to clinical notes while providing explicit justifications for each assignment. Recent approaches employ large language models (LLMs) to generate such explanations. However, their performance remains limited due to a lack of understanding of the clinical meanings of ICD codes. Additionally, the vast ICD code space further complicates the task of accurate prediction. To address these challenges, we propose the ICDAGENT framework, which consists of two collaborative LLM agents: a coding agent and a critical agent. The coding agent extracts ICD codes and generates preliminary rationales, while the critical agent performs fine-grained chain-of-thought reasoning to verify and refine them. Furthermore, the critical agent is trained with a rationale-aware reward, combined with reinforcement learning, enabling it to distinguish between correct and incorrect reasoning and ensure explanation accuracy. Experiments across multiple ICD coding standards and datasets demonstrate that ICDAGENT achieves effective ICD coding with accurate and trustworthy explanations.

This paper presents AutoRAN, the first framework to automate the hijacking of internal safety reasoning in large reasoning models (LRMs). At its core, AutoRAN pioneers an execution simulation paradigm that leverages a weaker but less-aligned model to simulate execution reasoning for initial hijacking attempts and iteratively refine attacks by exploiting reasoning patterns leaked through the target LRM’s refusals. This approach steers the target model to bypass its own safety guardrails and elaborate on harmful instructions. We evaluate AutoRAN against state-of-the-art LRMs, including GPT-o3/o4-mini and Gemini-2.5-Flash, across multiple benchmarks (AdvBench, HarmBench, and StrongReject). Results show that AutoRAN achieves approaching 100% success rate within one or few turns, effectively neutralizing reasoning-based defenses even when evaluated by robustly aligned external models. This work reveals that the transparency of the reasoning process itself creates a critical and exploitable attack surface, highlighting the urgent need for new defenses that protect models’ reasoning traces rather than merely their final outputs.

Various watermarking methods (“watermarkers”) have been proposed to identify LLM-generated texts; yet, due to the lack of unified evaluation platforms, many critical questions remain under-explored: i) What are the strengths/limitations of various watermarkers, especially their attack robustness? ii) How do various design choices impact their robustness? iii) How to optimally operate watermarkers in adversarial environments? To fill this gap, we systematize existing LLM watermarkers and watermark removal attacks, mapping out their design spaces. We then develop WaterPark, a unified platform that integrates 10 state-of-the-art watermarkers and 12 representative attacks. More importantly, by leveraging WaterPark, we conduct a comprehensive assessment of existing watermarkers, unveiling the impact of various design choices on their attack robustness. We further explore the best practices to operate watermarkers in adversarial environments. We believe our study sheds light on current LLM watermarking techniques while WaterPark serves as a valuable testbed to facilitate future research.

This paper delves into a novel backdoor attack scenario, aiming to uncover potential security risks associated with Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) during multi-round open-ended conversations with users. In the practical use of MLLMs, users have full control over the interaction process with the model, such as using their own collected photos and posing arbitrary open-ended questions. Traditional backdoor attacks that rely on adding external triggers are less applicable. To this end, we introduce a new shadow-activated backdoor attacking paradigm in this paper, wherein attacks implicitly inject malicious content into the responses of MLLMs when the responses explicitly relate to the shadowed object, i.e., without any triggers. To facilitate the shadow-activated backdoor attack, we present a novel framework named BadMLLM to achieve the desired behaviors by constructing a poisoned dataset using GPT-4 Vision and implementing an attention-regularized tuning strategy to address the semantic discontinuity between the original response and the inserted promotion. Extensive experimental results conducted on five MLLMs, three objects, and two types of promotion slogans have demonstrated impressive performance in achieving both efficacy and utility goals, thereby highlighting the significant potential risks concealed within MLLMs.

Parameter Efficient Fine-Tuning (PEFT) offers an efficient solution for fine-tuning large pretrained language models for downstream tasks. However, most PEFT strategies are manually designed, often resulting in suboptimal performance. Recent automatic PEFT approaches aim to address this but face challenges such as search space entanglement, inefficiency, and lack of integration between parameter budgets and search processes. To overcome these issues, we introduce a novel Budget-guided Iterative search strategy for automatic PEFT (BIPEFT), significantly enhancing search efficiency. BIPEFT employs a new iterative search strategy to disentangle the binary module and rank dimension search spaces. Additionally, we design early selection strategies based on parameter budgets, accelerating the learning process by gradually removing unimportant modules and fixing rank dimensions. Extensive experiments on public benchmarks demonstrate the superior performance of BIPEFT in achieving efficient and effective PEFT for downstream tasks with a low parameter budget.