Evaluating whether a large language model (LLM) genuinely knows a concept remains a fundamental problem, since behavioral metrics can be fooled by suppression: a model that refuses to answer may still harbor recoverable knowledge. We introduce **Activation Fragmentation**, a framework that diagnoses parametric knowledge directly from internal geometry, with no token generation. The framework measures the geometric coherence of anon-vectors, the differences in hidden states between a concept-specific query and its anonymized paraphrase, and shows that genuine knowledge forms a tight, low-entropy cluster while ignorance forces geometric fragmentation. Across ten instruction-tuned LLMs from three model families, all fragmentation metrics reliably separate known from unknown concepts, and post-unlearning, fragmentation geometry correlates with adversarial recovery across four attack types and five unlearning algorithms, though the direction of that relationship is shown to depend on attack methodology. Furthermore, a layer-resolved analysis reveals that different adversarial mechanisms exploit this geometry at varying depths, with high attack-specific correlations that are invisible to behavioral evaluation. Together, these results constitute a single-phase, attack-free proxy for unlearning robustness that captures aspects of parametric knowledge inaccessible to output-level metrics.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world applications, the need to selectively remove unwanted knowledge while preserving model utility has become paramount. Recent work has explored sparse autoencoders (SAEs) to perform precise interventions on monosemantic features. However, most SAE-based methods operate at inference time, which does not create persistent changes in the model’s parameters. Such interventions can be bypassed or reversed by malicious actors with parameter access. We introduce CRISP, a parameter-efficient method for persistent concept unlearning using SAEs. CRISP automatically identifies salient SAE features across multiple layers and suppresses their activations. We experiment with two LLMs and show that our method outperforms prior approaches on safety-critical unlearning tasks from the WMDP benchmark, successfully removing harmful knowledge while preserving general and in-domain capabilities. Feature-level analysis reveals that CRISP achieves semantically coherent separation between target and benign concepts, allowing precise suppression of the target features.

Humans use introspection to evaluate their understanding through private internal states inaccessible to external observers. We investigate whether large language models possess similar privileged knowledge about answer correctness, information unavailable through external observation. We train correctness classifiers on question representations from both a model’s own hidden states and external models, testing whether self-representations provide a performance advantage. On standard evaluation, we find no advantage: self-probes perform comparably to peer-model probes. We hypothesize this is due to high inter-model agreement of answer correctness. To isolate genuine privileged knowledge, we evaluate on disagreement subsets, where models produce conflicting predictions. Here, we discover domain-specific privileged knowledge: self-representations consistently outperform peer representations in factual knowledge tasks, but show no advantage in math reasoning. We further localize this domain asymmetry across model layers, finding that the factual advantage emerges progressively from early-to-mid layers onward, consistent with model-specific memory retrieval, while math reasoning shows no consistent advantage at any depth.

Language models (LMs) risk inadvertently memorizing and divulging sensitive or personally identifiable information (PII) seen in training data, causing privacy concerns. Current approaches to address this issue involve costly dataset scrubbing, or model filtering through unlearning and model editing, which can be bypassed through extraction attacks. We propose REVS, a novel non-gradient-based method for unlearning sensitive information from LMs. REVS identifies and modifies a small subset of neurons relevant for constituent tokens which form sensitive information. To adequately evaluate our method on truly sensitive information, we curate three datasets: an email and URL datasets naturally memorized by the models, and a synthetic social security number dataset that we tune the models to memorize. Compared to other methods, REVS demonstrates superior performance in unlearning sensitive information and robustness to extraction attacks, while retaining underlying model integrity.