Despite extensive alignment efforts, Large Language Models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to generating unsafe content under adversarial prompting, yet the internal mechanisms by which safety behaviors are implemented remain poorly understood. We study LLM safety from a mechanistic interpretability perspective and characterize a multi-stage *safety circuit* that organizes refusal behavior, consisting of (i) Harmful Detection Heads that respond to harmful inputs, (ii) Safety Neurons that mediate and stabilize safety signals in the residual stream, and (iii) Refusal Heads that translate these signals into safe response generation. Using targeted attention-head and neuron-level interventions, we provide causal evidence consistent with this circuit organization, showing that suppressing upstream Harmful Detection Heads disrupts downstream refusal behavior and that safety neurons mediate this interaction. We validate that this decomposition recurs across multiple LLM architectures and adversarial attack settings, and use simple, architecture-preserving weight scaling as a mechanistic probe to test its functional relevance. Across six LLMs, circuit-guided scaling improves safety rates under attacks by 26.5%, while incurring only a 1.7% accuracy drop across four standard benchmarks. Overall, our results support a circuit-level interpretation of LLM safety and suggest that mechanistic abstractions can reveal stable and transferable patterns underlying aligned behavior.

Are tool-calling LLM agents equally safe throughout a conversation? We discover they are not: agents are most vulnerable at the very start of a session and become substantially safer after a few regular agentic tasks—a phenomenon we term the cold-start safety gap. To study this systematically, we introduce Safety Over Depth for Agents (SODA), a benchmark that controls how many regular agentic tasks the agent completes before encountering a safety threat, supporting up to 20 preceding tasks. Evaluating 7 models from 4 families, safety improves by 9–52% as the number of preceding regular agentic tasks increases from zero to twenty. Representation analysis confirms that model hidden states gradually shift toward a safety-aligned region as more preceding tasks are present. By systematically studying which part of the preceding conversation matters most, we find that the regular agentic tasks themselves are the primary driver of safety, while the agent’s own prior responses have less effect on safety but are essential for preserving later utility. This conclusion is further supported by evaluation on open-source safety benchmarks (AgentHarm, Agent Safety Bench) and utility benchmarks (BFCL, API-Bank), confirming that warming up the agent with regular agentic tasks before deployment makes it safer and preserves full capability. Based on these findings, we recommend a simple deployment strategy: having the agent complete a few regular agentic tasks before possible exposure to safety-critical requests mitigates the cold-start safety gap.

Recent research has shown that Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to automated jailbreak attacks, where adversarial suffixes crafted by algorithms appended to harmful queries bypass safety alignment and trigger unintended responses. Current methods for generating these suffixes are computationally expensive and have low Attack Success Rates (ASR), especially against well-aligned models like Llama2 and Llama3. To overcome these limitations, we introduce ADV-LLM, an iterative self-tuning process that crafts adversarial LLMs with enhanced jailbreak ability. Our framework significantly reduces the computational cost of generating adversarial suffixes while achieving nearly 100% ASR on various open-source LLMs. Moreover, it exhibits strong attack transferability to closed-source models, achieving 99% ASR on GPT-3.5 and 49% ASR on GPT-4, despite being optimized solely on Llama3. Beyond improving jailbreak ability, ADV-LLM provides valuable insights for future safety alignment research through its ability to generate large datasets for studying LLM safety.

Recent studies have shown that Large Language Models (LLMs) augmented with chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning demonstrate impressive problem-solving abilities. However, in this work, we identify a recurring issue where these models occasionally generate overly short reasoning, leading to degraded performance on even simple mathematical problems. Specifically, we investigate how reasoning length is embedded in the hidden representations of reasoning models and its impact on accuracy. Our analysis reveals that reasoning length is governed by a linear direction in the representation space, allowing us to induce overly short reasoning by steering the model along this direction. Building on this insight, we introduce ThinkEdit, a simple yet effective weight-editing approach to mitigate the issue of overly short reasoning. We first identify a small subset of attention heads (approximately 4%) that predominantly drive short reasoning behavior. We then edit the output projection weights of these heads to remove the short reasoning direction. With changes to only 0.2% of the model’s parameters, ThinkEdit effectively reduces overly short reasoning and yields notable accuracy gains for short reasoning outputs (+6.39%), along with an overall improvement across multiple math benchmarks (+3.34%). Our findings provide new mechanistic insights into how reasoning length is controlled within LLMs and highlight the potential of fine-grained model interventions to improve reasoning quality.