Other people with similar names: Wei Chen, Wei Chen, Wei Chen, Wei Chen, Wei Chen, Wei Chen, Wei Chen

Unverified author pages with similar names: Wei Chen


2025

As large language models (LLMs) become an important way of information access, there have been increasing concerns that LLMs may intensify the spread of unethical content, including implicit bias that hurts certain populations without explicit harmful words. In this paper, we conduct a rigorous evaluation of LLMs’ implicit bias towards certain demographics by attacking them from a psychometric perspective to elicit agreements to biased viewpoints. Inspired by psychometric principles in cognitive and social psychology, we propose three attack approaches, i.e., Disguise, Deception, and Teaching. Incorporating the corresponding attack instructions, we built two benchmarks: (1) a bilingual dataset with biased statements covering four bias types (2.7K instances) for extensive comparative analysis, and (2) BUMBLE, a larger benchmark spanning nine common bias types (12.7K instances) for comprehensive evaluation. Extensive evaluation of popular commercial and open-source LLMs shows that our methods can elicit LLMs’ inner bias more effectively than competitive baselines. Our attack methodology and benchmarks offer an effective means of assessing the ethical risks of LLMs, driving progress toward greater accountability in their development.
Recent studies (CITATION) highlight a fundamental dichotomy in deep learning optimization: Although parameter updates along the top eigendirections of the loss Hessian (Dom-space) capture most of the update magnitude, they often contribute minimally to loss reduction. In contrast, updates in the orthogonal component (Bulk-space) have smaller magnitudes but drive most learning progress.In this work, we further advance the understanding of this phenomenon and introduce the Bulk-Space-Filtration-Accelerator (BSFA), a novel plug-and-play framework. BSFA accelerates training by differentially scaling update components projected onto these distinct subspaces, simultaneously enhancing stability by moderating updates in the dominant subspace and boosting convergence speed by amplifying those in the bulk-space.To ensure BSFA is both practical and scalable for contemporary large models, we introduce two key innovations: an efficient estimator using Principal Component Analysis (PCA) on historical updates for fast subspace estimation, and a block-wise strategy that applies this estimation on a per-parameter-block basis. These designs make BSFA computationally tractable and highly effective.We demonstrate BSFA’s acceleration across various tasks, notably achieving approximately 2× speedup when pre-training LLaMA-72M on WikiText-103 and LLaMA-134M on OpenWebText compared to vanilla AdamW.
To confront the ever-evolving safety risks of LLMs, automated jailbreak attacks have proven effective for proactively identifying security vulnerabilities at scale. Existing approaches, including GCG and AutoDAN, modify adversarial prompts to induce LLMs to generate responses that strictly follow a fixed affirmative template. However, we observed that the reliance on the rigid output template is ineffective for certain malicious requests, leading to suboptimal jailbreak performance. In this work, we aim to develop a method that is universally effective across all hostile requests. To achieve this, we explore LLMs’ intrinsic safety mechanism: a refusal stance towards the adversarial prompt is formed in a confined region and ultimately leads to a rejective response. In light of this, we propose Stance Manipulation (SM), a novel automated jailbreak approach that generates jailbreak prompts to suppress the refusal stance and induce affirmative responses. Our experiments across four mainstream open-source LLMs demonstrate the superiority of SM’s performance. Under commenly used setting, SM achieves success rates over 77.1% across all models on Advbench. Specifically, for Llama-2-7b-chat, SM outperforms the best baseline by 25.4%. In further experiments with extended iterations in a speedup setup, SM achieves over 92.2% attack success rate across all models. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/Zed630/Stance-Manipulation.