Recent interest in multimodal large language models (MLLMs) raises a central question: can they reason over dynamic visual evidence rather than merely recognize objects or events in individual frames? This ability, which we refer to as *video temporal-logical reasoning*, requires models to maintain, update, and compose evidence as visual states evolve across frames. Existing video benchmarks often conflate this capability with scene complexity, static recognition, or uncontrolled temporal variation. To isolate this capability, we introduce Video-MME-Logical, a controlled benchmark organized around five temporal-logical operations: state tracking, sequential counting, temporal ordering, dynamic spatiality, and structural composition. The benchmark contains 25 fine-grained task categories generated with controlled object states, transitions, temporal dependencies, and logical compositions. It enables difficulty-controlled final-answer evaluation by varying temporal horizon and reasoning complexity, and supports intermediate-state diagnostics by verifying whether models recover the required logical reasoning trace before producing the final answer. Experiments with state-of-the-art MLLMs reveal a substantial human-model gap, especially as temporal-logical complexity increases. Supervised fine-tuning on up to 500K generated samples improves performance but remains insufficient to close the reasoning gap, positioning Video-MME-Logical as a scalable testbed for analyzing and improving temporal-logical reasoning in MLLMs.

The widespread use of Text-to-Image (T2I) models in content generation requires careful examination of their safety, including their robustness to adversarial attacks. Despite extensive research on adversarial attacks, the reasons for their effectiveness remain underexplored. This paper presents an empirical study on adversarial attacks against T2I models, focusing on analyzing factors associated with attack success rates (ASR). We introduce a new attack objective - entity swapping using adversarial suffixes and two gradient-based attack algorithms. Human and automatic evaluations reveal the asymmetric nature of ASRs on entity swap: for example, it is easier to replace “human” with “robot” in the prompt “a human dancing in the rain.” with an adversarial suffix, but the reverse replacement is significantly harder. We further propose probing metrics to establish indicative signals from the model’s beliefs to the adversarial ASR. We identify conditions that result in a success probability of 60% for adversarial attacks and others where this likelihood drops below 5%. The code and data are available at https://github.com/Patchwork53/AsymmetricAttack