Xin Fang
Author directory2026
SparkShield at ArA-DF 2026: Robust Arabic Speech Deepfake Detection via Realistic Audio Augmentation and Multi-Scale XLS-R Score Fusion
Xin Fang | Haitao Xu | Zhipeng Xie | Tian Gao | Junqin Cao | Cunhang Fan | Minghui Wu
Proceedings of The Fourth Arabic Natural Language Processing Conference: Shared Tasks
Xin Fang | Haitao Xu | Zhipeng Xie | Tian Gao | Junqin Cao | Cunhang Fan | Minghui Wu
Proceedings of The Fourth Arabic Natural Language Processing Conference: Shared Tasks
Bait-and-Recover: Poisoning Internal Refusal Signals to Defend LLMs against White-Box Editing Jailbreaks
Tian Gao | Zhipeng Xie | Yuhao Wu | Junhua Liu | Xin Fang
Proceedings of the 15th International Joint Conference on Natural Language Processing and the 5th Conference of the Asia-Pacific Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)
Tian Gao | Zhipeng Xie | Yuhao Wu | Junhua Liu | Xin Fang
Proceedings of the 15th International Joint Conference on Natural Language Processing and the 5th Conference of the Asia-Pacific Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)
Open-weight large language models face a low-cost white-box threat from representation engineering attacks. Attackers can estimate refusal directions and search for projection-matrix edits that suppress safety alignment while preserving general capabilities, within minutes on a single GPU and without gradient-based training. We propose Bait-and-Recover, a weight-level defense that places a bait adapter where attackers read activations and a paired recovery adapter at the subsequent layer. Trained via gradient routing, this decouples the observation path from the behavior path. By actively poisoning the residual signal used for measurement, Bait-and-Recover disrupts the attacker’s edit search, while the recovery layer restores clean downstream computation. Across four open-weight models, our defense raises the minimum refusal rate against white-box edit searches from 16.25% to 71.75% under a strict behavior-preservation budget (KL ≤ 0.10), with negligible impact on general benchmarks. By invalidating the core measurement assumption of these attacks, observation-path poisoning offers a practical complement to behavior-level safety training.