Text-to-spatial audio generation, such as text-to-First-Order Ambisonics (FOA), provides a convenient way to create spatial audio for billion-dollar gaming and film industries. However, existing text-to-FOA methods are largely data-driven and may produce audio that violates acoustic relations between source direction and distance. They also separate descriptive and parametric control, forcing users to trade usability for precision. In this paper, we present PhysWave, a physics-guided latent diffusion model for controllable text-to-FOA generation. PhysWave unifies natural-language and trajectory control through a shared waypoint-caption representation, and augments diffusion training with two differentiable acoustic priors: spherical-harmonic direction consistency and inverse-square distance consistency. To support dynamic spatial generation, we further construct a 300K-clip FOA dataset with diverse sound categories and source trajectories. Extensive results show that the proposed priors help PhysWave generate spatially consistent FOA audio while maintaining competitive audio quality. Further analyses show that these physics priors improve spatial consistency during training and can also be used as inference-time guidance for training-free spatial refinement.

With the widespread applications of large language models (LLMs), privacy-preserving inference has become increasingly essential for sensitive queries. To balance privacy and utility, a series of lightweight obfuscation approaches has recently been proposed, where users locally transform plaintext embeddings into the fixed ciphertext ones. While such Embedding-to-Embedding Obfuscation (E2EO) schemes demonstrate considerable resilience against traditional token frequency and embedding inversion attacks, the core mechanism behind remains to be the large-scale one-to-one substitution, which provides no cryptographic guarantees. In this paper, we propose Proxy Manifold Alignment (PMA), a novel attack against E2EO in privacy-preserving LLMs. Our key observation is that E2EO schemes keep the original semantic structure, so that the obfuscated vector stream can be regarded as an unknown tokenizer-language whose symbols are the vectors themselves. Therefore, the proposed ciphertext to plaintext reconstruction attack can be formulated as a translation task from the unknown tokenizer-language to plaintext. Specifically, by only accessing the obfuscated vector stream, the target tokenizer and a public corpus, the PMA attack first employs Word2Vec to model the co-occurrence patterns within the obfuscated stream and the public corpus independently, and constructs two proxy vector embeddings. Then, the attack aligns the underlying manifolds of these two embeddings based on structural similarity. Finally, it maps the obfuscated vectors back to plaintext. Experimental results demonstrate that PMA consistently achieves higher plaintext recovery than other state-of-the-art attack methods.