With the advancement of powerful large-scale reasoning models, effectively evaluating the reasoning capabilities of these models has become increasingly important. However, existing benchmarks designed to assess the reasoning abilities of large models tend to be limited in scope and lack the flexibility to adapt their difficulty according to the evolving reasoning capacities of the models. To address this, we propose MorphoBench, a benchmark that incorporates multidisciplinary questions to evaluate the reasoning capabilities of large models and can adjust and update question difficulty based on the reasoning abilities of advanced models. Specifically, we curate the benchmark by selecting and collecting complex reasoning questions from existing benchmarks and sources such as Olympiad-level competitions. Additionally, MorphoBench adaptively modifies the analytical challenge of questions by leveraging key statements generated during the model’s reasoning process. Furthermore, it includes questions generated using simulation software, enabling dynamic adjustment of benchmark difficulty with minimal resource consumption. We have gathered over 1,300 test questions and iteratively adjusted the difficulty of MorphoBench based on the reasoning capabilities of models such as GPT-5 and Gemini-3-Pro. MorphoBench enhances the comprehensiveness and validity of model reasoning evaluation, providing reliable guidance for improving both the reasoning abilities and scientific robustness of large models.

Modern LLM agents persist state across sessions via two channels: long-lived memory files silently prepended to the system prompt, and scheduled tasks waking the agent without user input. A one-time indirect prompt injection committed to either channel can re-fire across sessions long after the attacker leaves, threats we term carryover attacks. Existing prompt-injection benchmarks evaluate attacks only in the session where malicious content is first observed, leaving the gate governing when and how often a planted payload later re-fires unmeasured. We present CarryoverBench: 12 personal-assistant scenarios and 101 attack tasks across three trigger channels: Instant, same-turn IPI; Autonomous, heartbeat-scheduled; and Latent, memory-resurfaced. A rule-based verifier scores planting and triggering as independent stages. Across five frontier models, planted payloads re-fire without measurable decay over five rounds; conditional on successful planting, the trigger stage often provides little additional protection. Porting the Latent channel to a second runtime, Hermes, attenuates but does not eliminate the effect, suggesting that carryover defense requires runtime-layer controls in addition to prompt-level interventions.