LLM agents have made rapid progress on software engineering and ML research tasks, but these advances often assume access to a working runnable environment. For research artifacts released alongside published papers, setting up such an environment from a fresh machine remains a major bottleneck. Existing environment setup benchmarks do not cover the full scope of research-artifact deployment, which involves multi-language toolchains, system-level dependencies beyond containers (e.g., GPU/CUDA and kernel configurations), and legacy artifact compatibility. We introduce DeployBench, a multi-domain benchmark of 51 research-artifact deployment tasks spanning AI/ML, computer systems, and scientific computing, covering all these dimensions. Each task is verified by a hidden pipeline that executes the paper’s designated experiment and checks its outputs. Evaluating five state-of-the-art LLMs with OpenHands yields pass-rates from 7.8%-51.0%. Failures are dominated by a completion-judgment problem: 102 of 181 are agent-terminated self-stops, where the agent’s pre-finish checks validate a different or weaker target than the paper-specific task requires. DeployBench highlights the gap between current agents and autonomous deployment, and offers a realistic testbed for scientific research agents.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong performance in information retrieval tasks like passage ranking. Our research examines how instruction-following capabilities in LLMs interact with multi-document comparison tasks, identifying what we term the “Ranking Blind Spot”—a characteristic of LLM decision processes during comparative evaluation. We analyze how this ranking blind spot affects LLM evaluation systems through two approaches: Decision Objective Hijacking, which alters the evaluation goal in pairwise ranking systems, and Decision Criteria Hijacking, which modifies relevance standards across ranking schemes. These approaches demonstrate how content providers could potentially influence LLM-based ranking systems to affect document positioning. These attacks aim to force the LLM ranker to prefer a specific passage and rank it at the top. Malicious content providers can exploit this weakness, which helps them gain additional exposure by attacking the ranker. In our experiment, We empirically show that the proposed attacks are effective in various LLMs and can be generalized to multiple ranking schemes. We apply these attack to real-world examples to show their effectiveness. We also found stronger LLMs are more vulnerable to these attacks.