We present North Small Translate, an open-weight, LLM-based machine translation (MT) model with instruction-following capabilities built on the same foundation as Cohere’s Command A Plus, a mixture-of-experts architecture with 25 billion active parameters out of 218 billion total parameters. North Small Translate is trained using difficulty sampling to obtain challenging documents and a five-step training protocol combining supervised fine-tuning, direct preference optimization, and online reinforcement learning. We prioritized throughput through a non-reasoning base model and supplemented with optional agentic capabilities to unlock translation quality gains. North Small Translate is trained to perform MT-related tasks, including post-editing and quality estimation, as well as related tasks such as general instruction following. The model achieves top MT performance across 50 languages in the class of models under 1T parameters, with no need to run expensive reasoning at inference time.

Language models are prone to memorizing their training data, making them vulnerable to extraction attacks. While existing research often examines isolated setups, such as a single model or a fixed prompt, real-world adversaries have a considerably larger attack surface due to access to models across various sizes and checkpoints, and repeated prompting. In this paper, we revisit extraction attacks from an adversarial perspective—with multi-faceted access to the underlying data. We find significant churn in extraction trends, i.e., even unintuitive changes to the prompt, or targeting smaller models and earlier checkpoints, can extract distinct information. By combining multiple attacks, our adversary doubles (2 ×) the extraction risks, persisting even under mitigation strategies like data deduplication. We conclude with four case studies, including detecting pre-training data, copyright violations, extracting personally identifiable information, and attacking closed-source models, showing how our more realistic adversary can outperform existing adversaries in the literature.

In an effort to mitigate the harms of large language models (LLMs), learning from human feedback (LHF) has been used to steer LLMs towards outputs that are intended to be both less harmful and more helpful. Despite the widespread adoption of LHF in practice, the quality of this feedback and its effectiveness as a safety mitigation technique remain unclear. This study addresses these issues by auditing the widely-used Helpful and Harmless (HH) dataset by Anthropic. Our work includes: (1) a thorough investigation of the dataset’s content through both manual and automated evaluation; (2) experiments demonstrating the dataset’s impact on models’ safety; and (3) an analysis of the 100 most influential papers citing this dataset. Through our audit, we showcase how conceptualization failures and quality issues identified in the HH dataset can create additional harms by leading to disparate safety behaviors across demographic groups. Our findings highlight the need for more nuanced, context-sensitive approaches to safety mitigation in LLMs.