Other people with similar names: Yifan Zhu, Yifan Zhu

Unverified author pages with similar names: Yifan Zhu


2026

Frictive Policy Optimization treats friction in collaborative dialogue – misalignment, misunderstanding, repair – as an epistemic signal essential to common-ground construction, rather than noise to be minimized. However, FPO and its implementations have assumed shared perceptual contexts, where friction arises from differently interpreted propositions over the same scene, which we define as propositional asymmetry. We extend FPO to perceptual asymmetry, where participants hold asymmetric partial information and the same referring expression yields different denotations depending on whose information state grounds the reference. We evaluate this through cross-corpora analysis and LLM probing on referentially asymmetric dialogue tasks, primarily the HCRC MapTask. We find that FPO’s friction functional is empirically valid only when evaluated from within each participant’s information horizon: different landmark configurations produce qualitatively distinct grounding failure modes, with a small class of ambiguous configurations driving a disproportionate share of misunderstandings through trajectories that appear successful but silently diverge. The LLM probe confirms that having the right perspective matters more than having all perspectives: the informed single viewpoint outperforms omniscient access to both participants’ contexts. We propose two annotation refinements: subtype decomposition of pending grounding states and accommodation-aware alignment classification.
Establishing common ground, a shared set of beliefs and mutually recognized facts, is fundamental to collaboration, yet remains a challenge for current AI systems, especially in multimodal, multiparty settings, where the collaborators bring different information to the table. We introduce the Distributed Partial Information Puzzle (DPIP), a collaborative construction task that elicits rich multimodal communication under epistemic asymmetry. We present a multimodal dataset of these interactions, annotated and temporally aligned across speech, gesture, and action modalities to support reasoning over propositional content and belief dynamics. We then evaluate two paradigms for modeling common ground (CG): (1) state-of-the-art large language models (LLMs), prompted to infer shared beliefs from multimodal updates, and (2) an axiomatic pipeline grounded in Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) that incrementally performs the same task. Results on the annotated DPIP data indicate that it poses a challenge to modern LLMs’ abilities to track both task progression and belief state.
Productive dialogue alignment requires distinguishing surface coordination (acknowledgments and smooth task progression) from epistemic alignment (convergence of belief states); standard preference-based methods typically optimize response-level preferences without explicitly modeling the latter. We operationalize Theory-of-Mind (ToM) inference as a control signal within Frictive Policy Optimization by extracting, at each referring expression, a four-part belief structure: the speaker’s intended referent, the addressee’s interpretation, and each participant’s model of the other’s belief. This makes friction mechanically computable from epistemic-state comparisons, capturing silent divergence, where both participants proceed confidently while grounding to different referents. We evaluate the signal at two levels. At the representation level, ablating the second-order channel reduces misunderstanding recall from 65% to 26%. At the policy level, reward-shaping (FAR) and trust-region (FTR) variants improve intervention F1 and warranted-context calibration over DPO, with Brier scores independently supporting the calibration gains. Across three training runs, FAR and FTR remain substantially more stable, whereas DPO varies widely and can degrade intervention competence already present in the base policy. Thus, ToM-grounded friction provides a trainable signal for context-sensitive intervention under referential belief divergence.