LLM unlearning aims to remove the influence of undesirable knowledge from pretrained language models, which offers a practical mechanism for addressing safety and privacy concerns. Existing unlearning approaches, such as Gradient Ascent, are prone to catastrophic forgetting. Alignment-based approaches provide an alternative direction, yet their effectiveness is limited by the quality of the reference model. In realistic settings, both methods still require large retention datasets to preserve general knowledge. We propose a principled method that quantifies the target LLM’s confidence in undesirable knowledge and uses it to calibrate the model’s unlearning gradient updates more precisely. It enables fine-grained control over forgetting while better preserving model utility, thus reducing the dependence on retention data or prohibitive unlearning training data. Extensive evaluations on multiple benchmarks, including MUSE and WMDP, show that our method achieves effective unlearning and improves the trade-off between knowledge removal and utility preservation compared with state-of-the-art methods.

The protection of cyber Intellectual Property (IP) such as web content is an increasingly critical concern. The rise of large language models (LLMs) with online retrieval capabilities enables convenient access to information but often undermines the rights of original content creators. As users increasingly rely on LLM-generated responses, they gradually diminish direct engagement with original information sources, which will significantly reduce the incentives for IP creators to contribute, and lead to a saturating cyberspace with more AI-generated content. In response, we propose a novel defense framework that empowers web content creators to safeguard their web-based IP from unauthorized LLM real-time extraction and redistribution by leveraging the semantic understanding capability of LLMs themselves. Our method follows principled motivations and effectively addresses an intractable black-box optimization problem. Real-world experiments demonstrated that our methods improve defense success rates from 2.5% to 88.6% on different LLMs, outperforming traditional defenses such as configuration-based restrictions.