Jailbreak attacks have been observed to largely fail against recent reasoning models enhanced by Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning. However, the underlying mechanism remains underexplored, and relying solely on reasoning capacity may raise security concerns. In this paper, we try to answer the question: Does CoT reasoning really reduce harmfulness from jailbreaking? Through rigorous theoretical analysis, we demonstrate that CoT reasoning has dual effects on jailbreaking harmfulness. Based on the theoretical insights, we propose a novel jailbreak method, FicDetail, whose practical performance validates our theoretical findings.

The cross-domain text-to-SQL task aims to build a system that can parse user questions into SQL on complete unseen databases, and the single-domain text-to-SQL task evaluates the performance on identical databases. Both of these setups confront unavoidable difficulties in real-world applications. To this end, we introduce the cross-schema text-to-SQL task, where the databases of evaluation data are different from that in the training data but come from the same domain. Furthermore, we present CSS, a large-scale CrosS-Schema Chinese text-to-SQL dataset, to carry on corresponding studies. CSS originally consisted of 4,340 question/SQL pairs across 2 databases. In order to generalize models to different medical systems, we extend CSS and create 19 new databases along with 29,280 corresponding dataset examples. Moreover, CSS is also a large corpus for single-domain Chinese text-to-SQL studies. We present the data collection approach and a series of analyses of the data statistics. To show the potential and usefulness of CSS, benchmarking baselines have been conducted and reported. Our dataset is publicly available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/zhanghanchong/css.