In-context learning (ICL) enables models to adapt to new tasks via inference-time demonstrations. Despite its success in large language models, the extension of ICL to multimodal settings remains poorly understood in terms of its internal mechanisms and how it differs from text-only ICL. In this work, we conduct a systematic analysis of ICL in multimodal large language models. Using identical task formulations across modalities, we show that multimodal ICL performs comparably to text-only ICL in zero-shot settings but degrades significantly under few-shot demonstrations. To understand this gap, we decompose multimodal ICL into task mapping construction and task mapping transfer, and analyze how models establish cross-modal task mappings, and transfer them to query samples across layers. Our analysis reveals that current models lack reasoning-level alignment between visual and textual representations, and fail to reliably transfer learned task mappings to queries. Guided by these findings, we further propose a simple inference-stage enhancement method that reinforces task mapping transfer. Our results provide new insights into the mechanisms and limitations of multimodal ICL and suggest directions for more effective multimodal adaptation.

With the extensive deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs), ensuring their safety has become increasingly critical. However, existing defense methods often struggle with two key issues: (i) inadequate defense capabilities, particularly in domain-specific scenarios like chemistry, where a lack of specialized knowledge can lead to the generation of harmful responses to malicious queries. (ii) over-defensiveness, which compromises the general utility and responsiveness of LLMs. To mitigate these issues, we introduce a multi-agents-based defense framework, Guide for Defense (G4D), which leverages accurate external information to provide an unbiased summary of user intentions and analytically grounded safety response guidance. Extensive experiments on popular jailbreak attacks and benign datasets show that our G4D can enhance LLM’s robustness against jailbreak attacks on general and domain-specific scenarios without compromising the model’s general functionality.