Text-to-Image models may generate harmful content, such as pornographic images, particularly when unsafe prompts are submitted. To address this issue, safety filters are often added on top of text-to-image models, or the models themselves are aligned to reduce harmful outputs. However, these defenses remain vulnerable when an attacker strategically designs adversarial prompts to bypass these safety guardrails. In this work, we propose PromptTune, a method to jailbreak text-to-image models with safety guardrails using a fine-tuned large language model. Unlike other query-based jailbreak attacks that require repeated queries to the target model, our attack generates adversarial prompts efficiently after fine-tuning our AttackLLM. We evaluate our method on three datasets of unsafe prompts and against five safety guardrails. Our results demonstrate that our approach effectively bypasses safety guardrails, outperforms existing no-box attacks, and also facilitates other query-based attacks. Our code is available at https://github.com/zhengyuan-jiang/PromptTune.

Large Audio Language Models (LALMs) have demonstrated strong performance across a wide range of audio tasks. As they are increasingly deployed in real-world applications, ensuring their safety alignment has become more important. Although refusal mechanisms serve as a key safeguard by preventing LALMs from responding to harmful requests, they can also lead to over-refusal, where models incorrectly reject benign queries. This issue is especially challenging in the audio domain because speech that appears harmful in isolation may become benign when interpreted together with the surrounding acoustic context, such as background sounds. To study this problem, we introduce AOR-Bench (Audio Over-Refusal Benchmark), the first benchmark for over-refusal specifically designed for LALMs. AOR-Bench contains 3,000 pseudo-harmful audio samples across six scenario categories. Evaluating 12 representative LALMs from six major model families, we find that over-refusal is widespread and uncover several important patterns in their safety judgments. As a preliminary effort to mitigate this issue, we further explore two lightweight strategies (e.g., Chain-of-Thought prompting and activation steering) to reduce over-refusal.