Prompt injection attacks manipulate large language models (LLMs) by misleading them to deviate from the original input instructions and execute maliciously injected instructions, because of their instruction-following capabilities and inability to distinguish between the original input instructions and maliciously injected instructions. Currently, various prompt injection defense methods have been proposed, including prompt-engineering-based approaches and fine-tuning methods. Most of these methods instruct the model to follow the original input instructions, suppressing its inherent tendencies to follow the injected instructions. However, experimental results reveal that suppressing the model’s instruction-following tendencies is challenging. After analyzing successful attack cases, we find that the LLMs can correctly reference the instructions they are executing in some cases. Motivated by this finding, we propose a defense method that leverages LLMs’ instruction-following abilities rather than suppressing them. Our approach prompts LLMs to generate responses that include both the answers and their corresponding instruction references. Based on these references, we filter out answers whose references are not to the original input instructions. We conduct comprehensive experiments to evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed method. The results show that our approach outperforms prompt-engineering-based baselines and is comparable to fine-tuning methods, reducing the ASR to nearly 0% in some scenarios. Moreover, our approach has minimal impact on overall utility.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have exhibited extraordinary prowess in tasks like mathematics and coding, leveraging their advanced reasoning capabilities. Nevertheless, as these capabilities progress, significant concerns regarding their vulnerabilities and safety have arisen, which can pose challenges to their deployment and application in real-world settings. This paper presents the first comprehensive survey of LRMs, meticulously exploring and summarizing the newly emerged safety risks, attacks, and defense strategies specific to these powerful reasoning-enhanced models. By organizing these elements into a detailed taxonomy, this work aims to offer a clear and structured understanding of the current safety landscape of LRMs, facilitating future research and development to enhance the security and reliability of these powerful models.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable performance across a range of NLP tasks. However, their strong instruction-following capabilities and inability to distinguish instructions from data content make them vulnerable to indirect prompt injection attacks. In such attacks, instructions with malicious purposes are injected into external data sources, such as web documents. When LLMs retrieve this injected data through tools, such as a search engine and execute the injected instructions, they provide misled responses. Recent attack methods have demonstrated potential, but their abrupt instruction injection often undermines their effectiveness. Motivated by the limitations of existing attack methods, we propose TopicAttack, which prompts the LLM to generate a fabricated conversational transition prompt that gradually shifts the topic toward the injected instruction, making the injection smoother and enhancing the plausibility and success of the attack. Through comprehensive experiments, TopicAttack achieves state-of-the-art performance, with an attack success rate (ASR) over 90% in most cases, even when various defense methods are applied. We further analyze its effectiveness by examining attention scores. We find that a higher injected-to-original attention ratio leads to a greater success probability, and our method achieves a much higher ratio than the baseline methods.

Large language model (LLM) agents often struggle in environments where rules and required domain knowledge frequently change, such as regulatory compliance and user risk screening. To address this limitation, we propose the Adaptive Reflective Interactive Agent (ARIA), an LLM agent framework designed specifically to continuously learn updated domain knowledge at test time. ARIA assesses its own uncertainty through structured self-dialogue, proactively identifying knowledge gaps and requesting targeted explanations or corrections from human experts. It then systematically updates an internal, timestamped knowledge repository with provided human guidance, detecting and resolving conflicting or outdated knowledge through comparisons and clarification queries. We evaluate ARIA on the realistic customer due diligence name screening task on a global payment platform, alongside publicly available dynamic knowledge tasks. Results demonstrate significant improvements in adaptability and accuracy compared to baselines using standard offline fine-tuning and existing self-improving agents. ARIA has been deployed on a global payment platform serving over 150 million monthly active users.

Prompt injection attacks manipulate large language models (LLMs) by misleading them to deviate from the original input instructions and execute maliciously injected instructions, because of their instruction-following capabilities and inability to distinguish between the original input instructions and maliciously injected instructions. To defend against such attacks, recent studies have developed various detection mechanisms. If we restrict ourselves specifically to works which perform detection rather than direct defense, most of them focus on direct prompt injection attacks, while there are few works for the indirect scenario, where injected instructions are indirectly from external tools, such as a search engine. Moreover, current works mainly investigate injection detection methods and pay less attention to the post-processing method that aims to mitigate the injection after detection.In this paper, we investigate the feasibility of detecting and removing indirect prompt injection attacks, and we construct a benchmark dataset for evaluation. For detection, we assess the performance of existing LLMs and open-source detection models, and we further train detection models using our crafted training datasets. For removal, we evaluate two intuitive methods: (1) the segmentation removal method, which segments the injected document and removes parts containing injected instructions, and (2) the extraction removal method, which trains an extraction model to identify and remove injected instructions.