Large reasoning models (LRMs) have attracted much attention due to their exceptional performance. However, their performance mainly stems from thinking, a long Chain of Thought (CoT), which significantly increase computational overhead. To address this overthinking problem, existing work focuses on using reinforcement learning (RL) to train hybrid reasoning models that automatically decide whether to engage in thinking or not based on the complexity of the query. Unfortunately, using RL will suffer the the reward hacking problem, e.g., the model engages in thinking but is judged as not doing so, resulting in incorrect rewards.To mitigate this problem, existing works either employ supervised fine-tuning (SFT), which incurs high computational costs, or enforce uniform token limits on non-thinking responses, which yields limited mitigation of the problem.In this paper, we propose Thinking-Based Non-Thinking (TNT). It does not employ SFT, and sets different maximum token usage for responses not using thinking across various queries by leveraging information from the solution component of the responses using thinking. Experiments on five mathematical benchmarks demonstrate that TNT reduces token usage by around 50\\%$ compared to DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-1.5B/7B and DeepScaleR-1.5B, while significantly improving accuracy. In fact, TNT achieves the optimal trade-off between accuracy and efficiency among all tested methods. Additionally, the probability of reward hacking problem in TNT’s responses, which are classified as not using thinking, remains below $10\\%$ across all tested datasets.

Large Language Models (LLMs), due to substantial computational requirements, are vulnerable to resource consumption attacks, which can severely degrade server performance or even cause crashes, as demonstrated by denial-of-service (DoS) attacks designed for LLMs. However, existing works lack mitigation strategies against such threats, resulting in unresolved security risks for real-world LLM deployments. To this end, we propose the Pluggable and Dynamic DoS-Defense Framework (PD³F), which employs a two-stage approach to defend against resource consumption attacks from both the input and output sides. On the input side, we propose the Resource Index to guide Dynamic Request Polling Scheduling, thereby reducing computing resource usage induced by malicious prompts under high-concurrency scenarios. On the output side, we introduce the Adaptive End-Based Suppression mechanism, which reduces excessive malicious generation. Experiments across six models demonstrate that PD³F significantly mitigates resource consumption attacks, improving users’ access capacity by up to 500% during adversarial load. PD³F represents a step toward the resilient and resource-aware deployment of LLMs against resource consumption attacks.