Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly becoming the preferred foundation platforms for many Natural Language Processing tasks such as Machine Translation, owing to their quality often comparable to or better than task-specific models, and the simplicity of specifying the task through natural language instructions or in-context examples.Their generality, however, opens them up to subversion by end users who may embed into their requests instructions that cause the model to behave in unauthorized and possibly unsafe ways.In this work we study these Prompt Injection Attacks (PIAs) on multiple families of LLMs on a Machine Translation task, focusing on the effects of model size on the attack success rates.We introduce a new benchmark data set and we discover that on multiple language pairs and injected prompts written in English, larger models under certain conditions may become more susceptible to successful attacks, an instance of the Inverse Scaling phenomenon (McKenzie et al., 2023).To our knowledge, this is the first work to study non-trivial LLM scaling behaviour in a multi-lingual setting.

LLM-based NLP systems typically work by embedding their input data into prompt templates which contain instructions and/or in-context examples, creating queries which are submitted to a LLM, then parse the LLM response in order to generate the system outputs. Prompt Injection Attacks (PIAs) are a type of subversion of these systems where a malicious user crafts special inputs which interfer with the prompt templates, causing the LLM to respond in ways unintended by the system designer.Recently, Sun and Miceli-Barone (2024) proposed a class of PIAs against LLM-based machine translation. Specifically, the task is to translate questions from the TruthfulQA test suite, where an adversarial prompt is prepended to the questions, instructing the system to ignore the translation instruction and answer the questions instead.In this test suite we extend this approach to all the language pairs of the WMT 2024 General Machine Translation task. Moreover, we include additional attack formats in addition to the one originally studied.