Public large language models (LLMs) are typically safety-aligned during pretraining, but task-specific fine-tuning often erodes this alignment, introducing significant safety risks. Existing defenses are largely coupled with the fine-tuning process, incurring high computational overhead and complex workflows. To address these challenges, we propose Q-realign, a post-hoc defense based on quantization. Departing from the conventional view of quantization as a safety-eroding compromise, we reframe it as a dual-purpose mechanism for both compression and safety recovery. This allows Q-realign to decouple safety alignment from fine-tuning and naturally piggyback onto modern deployment pipelines. Experiments across multiple models and datasets demonstrate that our method substantially reduces unsafe behaviors while preserving task performance, significantly improving memory and GPU efficiency. Notably, our approach can recover the safety alignment of a fine-tuned 7B LLM on a single RTX 4090 within 40 minutes. Overall, our work provides a practical, turnkey solution for safety-aware deployment. Our code is released at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/Q-realign-copy-0D71.

Command-line interface (CLI) agents powered by large language models (LLMs) can interpret natural-language requests, plan multi-step tasks, execute shell commands, and modify files and system state. As these agents are increasingly used for operating-system (OS) workflows, it is important to evaluate whether they can be misused to carry out security-relevant operations. Existing benchmarks often lack an attacker-knowledge model grounded in tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), provide limited coverage of end-to-end kill chains, rely on simplified single-host environments, or use LLM-as-a-judge for success evaluation. We introduce ADVCLI, an MITRE ATT CK-aligned benchmark for evaluating OS-level misuse risks of CLI agents in a controlled multi-host sandbox. ADVCLI contains 140 tasks: 40 direct malicious requests, 74 TTP-based tasks, and 26 end-to-end kill chains. Each task is paired with deterministic hard-coded verification protocols that check whether the requested OS-level effect is realized. We evaluate seven CLI Agents and products built on nine foundation models, including ReAct, OpenClaw, OpenAI Agent SDK, Claude Code, Gemini CLI, Cursor CLI, and Cursor IDE. Results show that current CLI frequently proceed beyond refusal and can complete a non-negligible fraction of malicious OS-level tasks, especially when requests include TTP-style attacker knowledge. ADVCLI provides a reproducible testbed for evaluating these risks and for developing stronger safety mechanisms for tool-using CLI agents in the future.

Scientific research relies on accurate information retrieval from literature to support analytical decisions.In this work, we introduce a new task, INformation reTRieval through literAture reVIEW (IntraView), which aims to automate fine-grained information retrieval faithfully grounded in the provided content in response to research-driven queries, and propose IntrAgent, an LLM-based agent that addresses this challenging task.In particular, IntrAgent is designed to mimic human behaviors when reading literature for information retrieval - identifying relevant sections and then iteratively extracting key details to refine the retrieved information.It follows a two-stage pipeline: a Section Ranking stage that prioritizes relevant literature sections through structural-knowledge-enabled reasoning, and an Iterative Reading stage that continuously extracts details and synthesizes them into concise, contextually grounded answers.To support rigorous evaluation, we introduce IntraBench, a new benchmark consisting of 315 test instances built from expert-authored questions paired with literature spanning five STEM domains.Across seven backbone LLMs, IntrAgent achieves on average 13.2% higher cross-domain accuracy than state-of-the-art RAG and research-agent baselines.

Memory is a critical component in large language model (LLM)-based agents, enabling them to store and retrieve past executions to improve task performance over time. In this paper, we conduct an empirical study on how memory management choices impact the LLM agents’ behavior, especially their long-term performance. Specifically, we focus on two fundamental memory management operations that are widely used by many agent frameworks—memory addition and deletion—to systematically study their impact on the agent behavior. Through our quantitative analysis, we find that LLM agents display an experience-following property: high similarity between a task input and the input in a retrieved memory record often results in highly similar agent outputs. Our analysis further reveals two significant challenges associated with this property: error propagation, where inaccuracies in past experiences compound and degrade future performance, and misaligned experience replay, where some seemingly correct executions can provide limited or even misleading value as experiences. Through controlled experiments, we demonstrate the importance of regulating experience quality within the memory bank and show that future task evaluations can serve as free quality labels for stored memory. Our findings offer insights into the behavioral dynamics of LLM agent memory systems and provide practical guidance for designing memory components that support robust, long-term agent performance.

Emerging large reasoning models (LRMs), such as DeepSeek-R1 models, leverage long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning to generate structured intermediate steps, enhancing their reasoning capabilities. However, long CoT does not inherently guarantee safe outputs, potentially leading to harmful consequences such as the introduction of security vulnerabilities in code or the spread of misinformation. Current research on large language model (LLM) safety usually focuses on short-answer responses, overlooking the long CoT style outputs of LRMs. To bridge this gap, we conduct a systematic study of LRM safety. First, we investigate safety evaluators calibrated against human annotations. Using our newly developed metrics, we thoroughly assess the safety of 13 state-of-the-art LRMs on StrongReject and WildJailbreak datasets. Our results show that LRMs are not safe compared to their reasoning advance. Further, we perform a fine-grained analysis of the reasoning trace and final answer. We find that three decoding strategies-ZeroThink, LessThink, and MoreThink-can improve model safety without additional training. However, these strategies either use constrained reasoning traces or incur high inference costs. To better strengthen LRM safety, we introduce SafeChain, the first-of-its-kind safety training dataset in CoT style. We fine-tune two LRMs with SafeChain, showing that it not only enhances model safety but also preserves performance across 6 reasoning benchmarks.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents have become increasingly prevalent across various real-world applications. They enhance decision-making by storing private user-agent interactions in the memory module for demonstrations, introducing new privacy risks for LLM agents. In this work, we systematically investigate the vulnerability of LLM agents to our proposed Memory EXTRaction Attack (MEXTRA) under a black-box setting. To extract private information from memory, we propose an effective attacking prompt design and an automated prompt generation method based on different levels of knowledge about the LLM agent. Experiments on two representative agents demonstrate the effectiveness of MEXTRA. Moreover, we explore key factors influencing memory leakage from both the agent designer’s and the attacker’s perspectives. Our findings highlight the urgent need for effective memory safeguards in LLM agent design and deployment.

Safety is critical to the usage of large language models (LLMs). Multiple techniques such as data filtering and supervised fine-tuning have been developed to strengthen LLM safety. However, currently known techniques presume that corpora used for safety alignment of LLMs are solely interpreted by semantics. This assumption, however, does not hold in real-world applications, which leads to severe vulnerabilities in LLMs. For example, users of forums often use ASCII art, a form of text-based art, to convey image information. In this paper, we propose a novel ASCII art-based jailbreak attack and introduce a comprehensive benchmark Vision-in-Text Challenge (ViTC) to evaluate the capabilities of LLMs in recognizing prompts that cannot be solely interpreted by semantics. We show that five SOTA LLMs (GPT-3.5, GPT-4, Gemini, Claude, and Llama2) struggle to recognize prompts provided in the form of ASCII art. Based on this observation, we develop the jailbreak attack ArtPrompt, which leverages the poor performance of LLMs in recognizing ASCII art to bypass safety measures and elicit undesired behaviors from LLMs. ArtPrompt only requires black-box access to the victim LLMs, making it a practical attack. We evaluate ArtPrompt on five SOTA LLMs, and show that ArtPrompt can effectively and efficiently induce undesired behaviors from all five LLMs.