Zhiyuan Yu

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Unverified author pages with similar names: Zhiyuan Yu


2026

Multi-turn jailbreak attacks have emerged as a critical safety threat to LLMs, as the harmful objective is decomposed across a sequence of apparently benign turns to bypass guardrails. Existing defenses lack the reasoning capacity to identify evolving manipulation patterns, often trading helpfulness for safety by over-refusing benign requests related to sensitive topics. We introduce Trace, a multi-turn defense with trajectory-aware structured reasoning. Before generating each response, the model identifies manipulation cues from the trajectory, evaluates both the benign and adversarial interpretations of user intent, assigns a jailbreak score, and commits to an action: Allow, Caution, or Decline. We curate 4k multi-turn adversarial conversations from five attack frameworks, pair them with 2.4k benign dialogs, and 600 sensitive-but-benign conversations. We train Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct with SFT and GRPO under a multi-component reward that jointly optimizes helpfulness on benign prompts and robustness against jailbreak attempts. Across seven multi-turn attack benchmarks, Trace attains an average attack success rate (ASR) of 14.5% against 31.4% for the strongest baseline and 74.9% for the undefended target while raising the attacker effort required per successful jailbreak significantly. Trace also balances usability and safety, achieving a 93.3% average compliance on over-refusal benchmarks.
Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) are vulnerable to a growing array of multimodal jailbreak attacks, necessitating defenses that are both generalizable to novel threats and efficient for practical deployment. Many current strategies fall short, either targeting specific attack patterns, which limits generalization, or imposing high computational overhead. While lightweight anomaly-detection methods offer a promising direction, we find that their common one-class design tends to confuse unseen benign inputs with malicious ones, leading to unreliable over-rejection. To address this, we propose Representational Contrastive Scoring (RCS), a framework built on a key insight: the most potent safety signals reside within the LVLM’s own internal representations. Our approach inspects the internal geometry of these representations, learning a lightweight projection to maximally separate benign and malicious inputs in safety-critical layers. This enables a simple yet powerful contrastive score that differentiates true malicious intent from mere distribution shift. Our instantiations, MCD (Mahalanobis Contrastive Detection) and KCD (K-nearest Contrastive Detection), achieve state-of-the-art performance on a challenging evaluation protocol designed to test generalization to unseen attack types. This work demonstrates that effective jailbreak detection can be achieved by applying simple, interpretable statistical methods to the internal representations, offering a practical path towards safer LVLM deployment.
Visual evidence selection is a critical component of multimodal retrieval-augmented generation (RAG), yet existing methods typically rely on semantic relevance or surface-level similarity, which are often misaligned with the actual utility of visual evidence for downstream reasoning. We reformulate multimodal evidence selection from an information-theoretic perspective by defining evidence utility as the information gain induced on a model’s output distribution. To overcome the intractability of answer-space optimization, we introduce a latent notion of evidence helpfulness and theoretically show that, under mild assumptions, ranking evidence by information gain on this latent variable is equivalent to answer-space utility. We further propose a training-free, surrogate-accelerated framework that efficiently estimates evidence utility using lightweight multimodal models. Experiments on MRAG-Bench and Visual-RAG across multiple model families demonstrate that our method consistently outperforms state-of-the-art RAG baselines while achieving substantial reductions in computational cost. We release our code at https://github.com/Hcnaeg/utility-mrag.