With the increasing capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs), the proliferation of AI-generated texts has become a serious concern. Given the diverse range of organizations providing LLMs, it is crucial for governments and third-party entities to identify the origin LLM of a given AI-generated text to enable accurate mitigation of potential misuse and infringement. However, existing detection methods, primarily designed to distinguish between human-generated and LLM-generated texts, often fail to accurately identify the origin LLM due to the high similarity of AI-generated texts from different LLMs. In this paper, we propose a novel black-box AI-generated text origin detection method, dubbed Profiler, which accurately predicts the origin of an input text by extracting distinct context inference patterns through calculating and analyzing novel context losses between the surrogate model’s output logits and the adjacent input context. Extensive experimental results show that Profiler outperforms 10 state-of-the-art baselines, achieving more than a 25% increase in AUC score on average across both natural language and code datasets when evaluated against five of the latest commercial LLMs under both in-distribution and out-of-distribution settings.

Large language models (LLMs) play a crucial role in modern applications but face vulnerabilities related to the extraction of sensitive information. This includes unauthorized accesses to internal prompts and retrieval of personally identifiable information (PII) (e.g., in Retrieval-Augmented Generation based agentic applications). We examine these vulnerabilities in a question-answering (QA) setting where LLMs use retrieved documents or training knowledge as few-shot prompts. Although these documents remain confidential under normal use, adversaries can manipulate input queries to extract private content. In this paper, we propose a novel attack method by exploiting the model’s lower-ranked output tokens to leak sensitive information. We systematically evaluate our method, demonstrating its effectiveness in both the agentic application privacy extraction setting and the direct training data extraction. These findings reveal critical privacy risks in LLMs and emphasize the urgent need for enhanced safeguards against information leakage.