As post-training techniques evolve, large language models (LLMs) are increasingly augmented with structured multi-step reasoning abilities, often optimized through reinforcement learning. These reasoning-enhanced models outperform standard LLMs on complex tasks and now underpin many commercial LLM APIs. However, to protect proprietary behavior and reduce verbosity, providers typically conceal the reasoning traces while returning only the final answer. This opacity introduces a critical transparency gap: users are billed for invisible reasoning tokens, which often account for the majority of the cost, yet have no means to verify their authenticity. This opens the door to token count manipulation, where providers may overreport token usage or inject synthetic, low-effort tokens to inflate charges, a threat that can be carried out at near-zero cost. To address this issue, we propose CoIn, a verification framework that audits both the quantity and semantic validity of hidden tokens. CoIn constructs a verifiable hash tree from token embedding fingerprints to check token counts, and uses embedding-based relevance matching to detect fabricated reasoning content. Experiments demonstrate that CoIn, when deployed as a trusted third-party auditor, can effectively detect token count manipulation with a success rate reaching up to 94.7%, demonstrating a strong ability to restore billing transparency in opaque LLM services. The dataset and code are available at https://github.com/CASE-Lab-UMD/LLM-Auditing-CoIn .

Consider a scenario where an author (e.g., activist, whistle-blower) with many public writings wishes to write “anonymously” when attackers may have already built an authorship attribution (AA) model based off of public writings including those of the author. To enable her wish, we ask a question “can one make the publicly released writings, T , unattributable so that AA models trained on T cannot attribute its authorship well?” Toward this question, we present a novel solution, UPTON, that exploits black-box data poisoning methods to weaken the authorship features in training samples and make released texts unlearnable. It is different from previous obfuscation works (e.g., adversarial attacks that modify test samples or backdoor works that only change the model outputs when triggering words occur). Using four authorship datasets (IMDb10, IMDb64, Enron and WJO), we present empirical validation where UPTON successfully downgrades the accuracy of AA models to the impractical level (e.g., ~ 35%) while keeping texts still readable (e.g., > 0.9 in BERTScore). UPTON remains effective to AA models that are already trained on available clean writings of authors.

Semantic Role Labeling (SRL) aims at recognizing the predicate-argument structure of a sentence and can be decomposed into two subtasks: predicate disambiguation and argument labeling. Prior work deals with these two tasks independently, which ignores the semantic connection between the two tasks. In this paper, we propose to use the machine reading comprehension (MRC) framework to bridge this gap. We formalize predicate disambiguation as multiple-choice machine reading comprehension, where the descriptions of candidate senses of a given predicate are used as options to select the correct sense. The chosen predicate sense is then used to determine the semantic roles for that predicate, and these semantic roles are used to construct the query for another MRC model for argument labeling. In this way, we are able to leverage both the predicate semantics and the semantic role semantics for argument labeling. We also propose to select a subset of all the possible semantic roles for computational efficiency. Experiments show that the proposed framework achieves state-of-the-art or comparable results to previous work.