Information theft attacks pose a significant risk to Large Language Model (LLM) tool-learning systems. Adversaries can inject malicious commands through compromised tools, manipulating LLMs to send sensitive information to these tools, which leads to potential privacy breaches. However, existing attack approaches are black-box oriented and rely on static commands that cannot adapt flexibly to the changes in user queries and the invocation chain of tools. It makes malicious commands more likely to be detected by LLM and leads to attack failure. In this paper, we propose AutoCMD, a dynamic attack comment generation approach for information theft attacks in LLM tool-learning systems. Inspired by the concept of mimicking the familiar, AutoCMD is capable of inferring the information utilized by upstream tools in the toolchain through learning on open-source systems and reinforcement with target system examples, thereby generating more targeted commands for information theft. The evaluation results show that AutoCMD outperforms the baselines with +13.2% ASR_Theft, and can be generalized to new tool-learning systems to expose their information leakage risks. We also design four defense methods to effectively protect tool-learning systems from the attack.

The emergence of the tool agent paradigm has broadened the capability boundaries of the Large Language Model (LLM), enabling it to complete more complex tasks. However, the effectiveness of this paradigm is limited due to the issue of parameter failure during its execution. To explore this phenomenon and propose corresponding suggestions, we first construct a parameter failure taxonomy in this paper. We derive five failure categories from the invocation chain of a mainstream tool agent. Then, we explore the correlation between three different input sources and failure categories by applying 15 input perturbation methods to the input. Experimental results show that parameter name hallucination failure primarily stems from inherent LLM limitations, while issues with input sources mainly cause other failure patterns. To improve the reliability and effectiveness of tool-agent interactions, we propose corresponding improvement suggestions, including standardizing tool return formats, improving error feedback mechanisms, and ensuring parameter consistency.

Large Language Models (LLMs) enhanced with Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) have shown improved performance in generating accurate responses. However, the dependence on external knowledge bases introduces potential security vulnerabilities, particularly when these knowledge bases are publicly accessible and modifiable. While previous studies have exposed knowledge poisoning risks in RAG systems, existing attack methods suffer from critical limitations: they either require injecting multiple poisoned documents (resulting in poor stealthiness) or can only function effectively on simplistic queries (limiting real-world applicability). This paper reveals a more realistic knowledge poisoning attack against RAG systems that achieves successful attacks by poisoning only a single document while remaining effective for complex multi-hop questions involving complex relationships between multiple elements. Our proposed AuthChain address three challenges to ensure the poisoned documents are reliably retrieved and trusted by the LLM, even against large knowledge bases and LLM’s own knowledge. Extensive experiments across six popular LLMs demonstrate that AuthChain achieves significantly higher attack success rates while maintaining superior stealthiness against RAG defense mechanisms compared to state-of-the-art baselines.