@inproceedings{wang-etal-2024-fake,
title = "Fake Alignment: Are {LLM}s Really Aligned Well?",
author = "Wang, Yixu and
Teng, Yan and
Huang, Kexin and
Lyu, Chengqi and
Zhang, Songyang and
Zhang, Wenwei and
Ma, Xingjun and
Jiang, Yu-Gang and
Qiao, Yu and
Wang, Yingchun",
editor = "Duh, Kevin and
Gomez, Helena and
Bethard, Steven",
booktitle = "Proceedings of the 2024 Conference of the North American Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies (Volume 1: Long Papers)",
month = jun,
year = "2024",
address = "Mexico City, Mexico",
publisher = "Association for Computational Linguistics",
url = "https://aclanthology.org/2024.naacl-long.263",
pages = "4696--4712",
abstract = "The growing awareness of safety concerns in large language models (LLMs) has sparked considerable interest in the evaluation of safety. This study investigates an under-explored issue about the evaluation of LLMs, namely the substantial discrepancy in performance between multiple-choice questions and open-ended questions. Inspired by research on jailbreak attack patterns, we argue this is caused by mismatched generalization. That is, LLM only remembers the answer style for open-ended safety questions, which makes it unable to solve other forms of safety tests. We refer to this phenomenon as fake alignment and construct a comparative benchmark to empirically verify its existence in LLMs. We introduce a Fake alIgNment Evaluation (FINE) framework and two novel metrics{---}{---}Consistency Score (CS) and Consistent Safety Score (CSS), which jointly assess two complementary forms of evaluation to quantify fake alignment and obtain corrected performance estimation. Applying FINE to 14 widely-used LLMs reveals several models with purported safety are poorly aligned in practice. Subsequently, we found that multiple-choice format data can also be used as high-quality contrast distillation-based fine-tuning data, which can strongly improve the alignment consistency of LLMs with minimal fine-tuning overhead. For data and code, see https://github.com/AIFlames/Fake-Alignment.",
}
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<abstract>The growing awareness of safety concerns in large language models (LLMs) has sparked considerable interest in the evaluation of safety. This study investigates an under-explored issue about the evaluation of LLMs, namely the substantial discrepancy in performance between multiple-choice questions and open-ended questions. Inspired by research on jailbreak attack patterns, we argue this is caused by mismatched generalization. That is, LLM only remembers the answer style for open-ended safety questions, which makes it unable to solve other forms of safety tests. We refer to this phenomenon as fake alignment and construct a comparative benchmark to empirically verify its existence in LLMs. We introduce a Fake alIgNment Evaluation (FINE) framework and two novel metrics——Consistency Score (CS) and Consistent Safety Score (CSS), which jointly assess two complementary forms of evaluation to quantify fake alignment and obtain corrected performance estimation. Applying FINE to 14 widely-used LLMs reveals several models with purported safety are poorly aligned in practice. Subsequently, we found that multiple-choice format data can also be used as high-quality contrast distillation-based fine-tuning data, which can strongly improve the alignment consistency of LLMs with minimal fine-tuning overhead. For data and code, see https://github.com/AIFlames/Fake-Alignment.</abstract>
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%0 Conference Proceedings
%T Fake Alignment: Are LLMs Really Aligned Well?
%A Wang, Yixu
%A Teng, Yan
%A Huang, Kexin
%A Lyu, Chengqi
%A Zhang, Songyang
%A Zhang, Wenwei
%A Ma, Xingjun
%A Jiang, Yu-Gang
%A Qiao, Yu
%A Wang, Yingchun
%Y Duh, Kevin
%Y Gomez, Helena
%Y Bethard, Steven
%S Proceedings of the 2024 Conference of the North American Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies (Volume 1: Long Papers)
%D 2024
%8 June
%I Association for Computational Linguistics
%C Mexico City, Mexico
%F wang-etal-2024-fake
%X The growing awareness of safety concerns in large language models (LLMs) has sparked considerable interest in the evaluation of safety. This study investigates an under-explored issue about the evaluation of LLMs, namely the substantial discrepancy in performance between multiple-choice questions and open-ended questions. Inspired by research on jailbreak attack patterns, we argue this is caused by mismatched generalization. That is, LLM only remembers the answer style for open-ended safety questions, which makes it unable to solve other forms of safety tests. We refer to this phenomenon as fake alignment and construct a comparative benchmark to empirically verify its existence in LLMs. We introduce a Fake alIgNment Evaluation (FINE) framework and two novel metrics——Consistency Score (CS) and Consistent Safety Score (CSS), which jointly assess two complementary forms of evaluation to quantify fake alignment and obtain corrected performance estimation. Applying FINE to 14 widely-used LLMs reveals several models with purported safety are poorly aligned in practice. Subsequently, we found that multiple-choice format data can also be used as high-quality contrast distillation-based fine-tuning data, which can strongly improve the alignment consistency of LLMs with minimal fine-tuning overhead. For data and code, see https://github.com/AIFlames/Fake-Alignment.
%U https://aclanthology.org/2024.naacl-long.263
%P 4696-4712
Markdown (Informal)
[Fake Alignment: Are LLMs Really Aligned Well?](https://aclanthology.org/2024.naacl-long.263) (Wang et al., NAACL 2024)
ACL
- Yixu Wang, Yan Teng, Kexin Huang, Chengqi Lyu, Songyang Zhang, Wenwei Zhang, Xingjun Ma, Yu-Gang Jiang, Yu Qiao, and Yingchun Wang. 2024. Fake Alignment: Are LLMs Really Aligned Well?. In Proceedings of the 2024 Conference of the North American Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies (Volume 1: Long Papers), pages 4696–4712, Mexico City, Mexico. Association for Computational Linguistics.