Benjamin I. P. Rubinstein
2024
SEEP: Training Dynamics Grounds Latent Representation Search for Mitigating Backdoor Poisoning Attacks
Xuanli He
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Qiongkai Xu
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Jun Wang
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Benjamin I. P. Rubinstein
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Trevor Cohn
Transactions of the Association for Computational Linguistics, Volume 12
Modern NLP models are often trained on public datasets drawn from diverse sources, rendering them vulnerable to data poisoning attacks. These attacks can manipulate the model’s behavior in ways engineered by the attacker. One such tactic involves the implantation of backdoors, achieved by poisoning specific training instances with a textual trigger and a target class label. Several strategies have been proposed to mitigate the risks associated with backdoor attacks by identifying and removing suspected poisoned examples. However, we observe that these strategies fail to offer effective protection against several advanced backdoor attacks. To remedy this deficiency, we propose a novel defensive mechanism that first exploits training dynamics to identify poisoned samples with high precision, followed by a label propagation step to improve recall and thus remove the majority of poisoned instances. Compared with recent advanced defense methods, our method considerably reduces the success rates of several backdoor attacks while maintaining high classification accuracy on clean test sets.
CERT-ED: Certifiably Robust Text Classification for Edit Distance
Zhuoqun Huang
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Neil G Marchant
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Olga Ohrimenko
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Benjamin I. P. Rubinstein
Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: EMNLP 2024
With the growing integration of AI in daily life, ensuring the robustness of systems to inference-time attacks is crucial. Among the approaches for certifying robustness to such adversarial examples, randomized smoothing has emerged as highly promising due to its nature as a wrapper around arbitrary black-box models. Previous work on randomized smoothing in natural language processing has primarily focused on specific subsets of edit distance operations, such as synonym substitution or word insertion, without exploring the certification of all edit operations. In this paper, we adapt Randomized Deletion (Huang et al., 2023) and propose, CERTified Edit Distance defense (CERT-ED) for natural language classification. Through comprehensive experiments, we demonstrate that CERT-ED outperforms the existing Hamming distance method RanMASK (Zeng et al., 2023) in 4 out of 5 datasets in terms of both accuracy and the cardinality of the certificate. By covering various threat models, including 5 direct and 5 transfer attacks, our method improves empirical robustness in 38 out of 50 settings.
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Co-authors
- Xuanli He 1
- Qiongkai Xu 1
- Jun Wang 1
- Trevor Cohn 1
- Zhuoqun Huang 1
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