Recently, the powerful large language models (LLMs) have been instrumental in propelling the progress of recommender systems (RS). However, while these systems have flourished, their susceptibility to security threats has been largely overlooked. In this work, we reveal that the introduction of LLMs into recommendation models presents new security vulnerabilities due to their emphasis on the textual content of items. We demonstrate that attackers can significantly boost an item’s exposure by merely altering its textual content during the testing phase, without requiring direct interference with the model’s training process. Additionally, the attack is notably stealthy, as it does not affect the overall recommendation performance and the modifications to the text are subtle, making it difficult for users and platforms to detect. Our comprehensive experiments across four mainstream LLM-based recommendation models demonstrate the superior efficacy and stealthiness of our approach. Our work unveils a significant security gap in LLM-based recommendation systems and paves the way for future research on protecting these systems.

SemEval task 4 aims to find a proper option from multiple candidates to resolve the task of machine reading comprehension. Most existing approaches propose to concat question and option together to form a context-aware model. However, we argue that straightforward concatenation can only provide a coarse-grained context for the MRC task, ignoring the specific positions of the option relative to the question. In this paper, we propose a novel MRC model by filling options into the question to produce a fine-grained context (defined as summary) which can better reveal the relationship between option and question. We conduct a series of experiments on the given dataset, and the results show that our approach outperforms other counterparts to a large extent.