Jinghui Chen


2024

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PromptFix: Few-shot Backdoor Removal via Adversarial Prompt Tuning
Tianrong Zhang | Zhaohan Xi | Ting Wang | Prasenjit Mitra | Jinghui Chen
Proceedings of the 2024 Conference of the North American Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies (Volume 1: Long Papers)

Pre-trained language models (PLMs) have attracted enormous attention over the past few years with their unparalleled performances. Meanwhile, the soaring cost to train PLMs as well as their amazing generalizability have jointly contributed to few-shot fine-tuning and prompting as the most popular training paradigms for natural language processing (NLP) models. Nevertheless, existing studies have shown that these NLP models can be backdoored such that model behavior is manipulated when trigger tokens are presented.In this paper, we propose PromptFix, a novel backdoor mitigation strategy for NLP models via adversarial prompt-tuning in few-shot settings.Unlike existing NLP backdoor removal methods, which rely on accurate trigger inversion and subsequent model fine-tuning, PromptFix keeps the model parameters intact and only utilizes two extra sets of soft tokens which approximate the trigger and counteract it respectively. The use of soft tokens and adversarial optimization eliminates the need to enumerate possible backdoor configurations and enables an adaptive balance between trigger finding and preservation of performance.Experiments with various backdoor attacks validate the effectiveness of the proposed method and the performances when domain shift is present further shows PromptFix’s applicability to models pretrained on unknown data source which is the common case in prompt tuning scenarios.

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Stealthy and Persistent Unalignment on Large Language Models via Backdoor Injections
Yuanpu Cao | Bochuan Cao | Jinghui Chen
Proceedings of the 2024 Conference of the North American Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies (Volume 1: Long Papers)

Recent developments in Large Language Models (LLMs) have manifested significant advancements. To facilitate safeguards against malicious exploitation, a body of research has concentrated on aligning LLMs with human preferences and inhibiting their generation of inappropriate content. Unfortunately, such alignments are often vulnerable: fine-tuning with a minimal amount of harmful data can easily unalign the target LLM. While being effective, such fine-tuning-based unalignment approaches also have their own limitations: (1) non-stealthiness, after fine-tuning, safety audits or red-teaming can easily expose the potential weaknesses of the unaligned models, thereby precluding their release/use. (2) non-persistence, the unaligned LLMs can be easily repaired through re-alignment, i.e., fine-tuning again with aligned data points. In this work, we show that it is possible to conduct stealthy and persistent unalignment on large language models via backdoor injections. We also provide a novel understanding of the relationship between the backdoor persistence and the activation pattern and further provide guidelines for potential trigger design. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that our proposed stealthy and persistent unalignment can successfully pass the safety evaluation while maintaining strong persistence against re-alignment defense.