We address a growing debate about the extent to which large language models (LLMs) produce behavior consistent with Theory of Mind (ToM) in humans. We present EPITOME: a battery of six experiments that tap diverse ToM capacities, including belief attribution, emotional inference, and pragmatic reasoning. We elicit a performance baseline from human participants for each task. We use the dataset to ask whether distributional linguistic information learned by LLMs is sufficient to explain ToM in humans. We compare performance of five LLMs to a baseline of responses from human comprehenders. Results are mixed. LLMs display considerable sensitivity to mental states and match human performance in several tasks. Yet, they commit systematic errors in others, especially those requiring pragmatic reasoning on the basis of mental state information. Such uneven performance indicates that human-level ToM may require resources beyond distributional information.

The relationship between language model tokenization and performance is an open area of research. Here, we investigate how different tokenization schemes impact number agreement in Spanish plurals. We find that morphologically-aligned tokenization performs similarly to other tokenization schemes, even when induced artificially for words that would not be tokenized that way during training. We then present exploratory analyses demonstrating that language model embeddings for different plural tokenizations have similar distributions along the embedding space axis that maximally distinguishes singular and plural nouns. Our results suggest that morphologically-aligned tokenization is a viable tokenization approach, and existing models already generalize some morphological patterns to new items. However, our results indicate that morphological tokenization is not strictly required for performance.

The success of Large Language Models (LLMs) in other domains has raised the question of whether LLMs can reliably assess and manipulate the readability of text. We approach this question empirically. First, using a published corpus of 4,724 English text excerpts, we find that readability estimates produced “zero-shot” from GPT-4 Turbo and GPT-4o mini exhibit relatively high correlation with human judgments (r = 0.76 and r = 0.74, respectively), out-performing estimates derived from traditional readability formulas and various psycholinguistic indices. Then, in a pre-registered human experiment (N = 59), we ask whether Turbo can reliably make text easier or harder to read. We find evidence to support this hypothesis, though considerable variance in human judgments remains unexplained. We conclude by discussing the limitations of this approach, including limited scope, as well as the validity of the “readability” construct and its dependence on context, audience, and goal.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are gaining popularity as partial solutions to the “symbol grounding problem” faced by language models trained on text alone. However, little is known about whether and how these multiple modalities are integrated. We draw inspiration from analogous work in human psycholinguistics on embodied simulation, i.e., the hypothesis that language comprehension is grounded in sensorimotor representations. We show that MLLMs are sensitive to implicit visual features like object shape (e.g., “The egg was in the skillet” implies a frying egg rather than one in a shell). This suggests that MLLMs activate implicit information about object shape when it is implied by a verbal description of an event. We find mixed results for color and orientation, and rule out the possibility that this is due to models’ insensitivity to those features in our dataset overall. We suggest that both human psycholinguistics and computational models of language could benefit from cross-pollination, e.g., with the potential to establish whether grounded representations play a functional role in language processing.

Most words are ambiguous—-i.e., they convey distinct meanings in different contexts—-and even the meanings of unambiguous words are context-dependent. Both phenomena present a challenge for NLP. Recently, the advent of contextualized word embeddings has led to success on tasks involving lexical ambiguity, such as Word Sense Disambiguation. However, there are few tasks that directly evaluate how well these contextualized embeddings accommodate the more continuous, dynamic nature of word meaning—-particularly in a way that matches human intuitions. We introduce RAW-C, a dataset of graded, human relatedness judgments for 112 ambiguous words in context (with 672 sentence pairs total), as well as human estimates of sense dominance. The average inter-annotator agreement (assessed using a leave-one-annotator-out method) was 0.79. We then show that a measure of cosine distance, computed using contextualized embeddings from BERT and ELMo, correlates with human judgments, but that cosine distance also systematically underestimates how similar humans find uses of the same sense of a word to be, and systematically overestimates how similar humans find uses of different-sense homonyms. Finally, we propose a synthesis between psycholinguistic theories of the mental lexicon and computational models of lexical semantics.

Human speakers have an extensive toolkit of ways to express themselves. In this paper, we engage with an idea largely absent from discussions of meaning in natural language understanding—namely, that the way something is expressed reflects different ways of conceptualizing or construing the information being conveyed. We first define this phenomenon more precisely, drawing on considerable prior work in theoretical cognitive semantics and psycholinguistics. We then survey some dimensions of construed meaning and show how insights from construal could inform theoretical and practical work in NLP.