Large language models (LLMs) have played a pivotal role in building communicative AI, yet they encounter the challenge of efficient updates. Model editing enables the manipulation of specific knowledge memories and the behavior of language generation without retraining. However, the robustness of model editing remains an open question. This work seeks to understand the strengths and limitations of editing methods, facilitating practical applications of communicative AI. We focus on three key research questions. RQ1: Can edited LLMs behave consistently resembling communicative AI in realistic situations? RQ2: To what extent does the rephrasing of prompts lead LLMs to deviate from the edited knowledge memory? RQ3: Which knowledge features are correlated with the performance and robustness of editing? Our empirical studies uncover a substantial disparity between existing editing methods and the practical application of LLMs. On rephrased prompts that are flexible but common in realistic applications, the performance of editing experiences a significant decline. Further analysis shows that more popular knowledge is memorized better, easier to recall, and more challenging to edit effectively.

Task-agnostic and transferable backdoors implanted in pre-trained language models (PLMs) pose a severe security threat as they can be inherited to any downstream task. However, existing methods rely on manual selection of triggers and backdoor representations, hindering their effectiveness and universality across different PLMs or usage paradigms. In this paper, we propose a new backdoor attack method called UOR, which overcomes these limitations by turning manual selection into automatic optimization. Specifically, we design poisoned supervised contrastive learning, which can automatically learn more uniform and universal backdoor representations. This allows for more even coverage of the output space, thus hitting more labels in downstream tasks after fine-tuning. Furthermore, we utilize gradient search to select appropriate trigger words that can be adapted to different PLMs and vocabularies. Experiments show that UOR achieves better attack performance on various text classification tasks compared to manual methods. Moreover, we test on PLMs with different architectures, usage paradigms, and more challenging tasks, achieving higher scores for universality.

Recent work has showcased the powerful capability of large language models (LLMs) in recalling knowledge and reasoning. However, the reliability of LLMs in combining these two capabilities into reasoning through multi-hop facts has not been widely explored. This paper systematically investigates the possibilities for LLMs to utilize shortcuts based on direct connections between the initial and terminal entities of multi-hop knowledge. We first explore the existence of factual shortcuts through Knowledge Neurons, revealing that: (i) the strength of factual shortcuts is highly correlated with the frequency of co-occurrence of initial and terminal entities in the pre-training corpora; (ii) few-shot prompting leverage more shortcuts in answering multi-hop questions compared to chain-of-thought prompting. Then, we analyze the risks posed by factual shortcuts from the perspective of multi-hop knowledge editing. Analysis shows that approximately 20% of the failures are attributed to shortcuts, and the initial and terminal entities in these failure instances usually have higher co-occurrences in the pre-training corpus. Finally, we propose erasing shortcut neurons to mitigate the associated risks and find that this approach significantly reduces failures in multiple-hop knowledge editing caused by shortcuts. Code is publicly available at https://github.com/Jometeorie/MultiHopShortcuts.

Backdoor attacks pose a critical security threat to natural language processing (NLP) models by establishing covert associations between trigger patterns and target labels without affecting normal accuracy. Existing attacks usually disregard fluency and semantic fidelity of poisoned text, rendering the malicious data easily detectable. However, text generation models can produce coherent and content-relevant text given prompts. Moreover, potential differences between human-written and AI-generated text may be captured by NLP models while being imperceptible to humans. More insidious threats could arise if attackers leverage latent features of AI-generated text as trigger patterns. We comprehensively investigate backdoor attacks on NLP models using AI-generated poisoned text obtained via continued writing or paraphrasing, exploring three attack scenarios: data, model and pre-training. For data poisoning, we fine-tune generators with attribute control to enhance the attack performance. For model poisoning, we leverage downstream tasks to derive specialized generators. For pre-training poisoning, we train multiple attribute-based generators and align their generated text with pre-defined vectors, enabling task-agnostic migration attacks. Experiments demonstrate that our method achieves effective attacks while maintaining fluency and semantic similarity across all scenarios. We hope this work can raise awareness of the security risks hidden in AI-generated text.

Previous work has showcased the intriguing capability of large language models (LLMs) in retrieving facts and processing context knowledge. However, only limited research exists on the layer-wise capability of LLMs to encode knowledge, which challenges our understanding of their internal mechanisms. In this paper, we devote the first attempt to investigate the layer-wise capability of LLMs through probing tasks. We leverage the powerful generative capability of ChatGPT to construct probing datasets, providing diverse and coherent evidence corresponding to various facts. We employ \mathcal V-usable information as the validation metric to better reflect the capability in encoding context knowledge across different layers. Our experiments on conflicting and newly acquired knowledge show that LLMs: (1) prefer to encode more context knowledge in the upper layers; (2) primarily encode context knowledge within knowledge-related entity tokens at lower layers while progressively expanding more knowledge within other tokens at upper layers; and (3) gradually forget the earlier context knowledge retained within the intermediate layers when provided with irrelevant evidence. Code is publicly available at https://github.com/Jometeorie/probing_llama.

The broad adoption of continuous prompts has brought state-of-the-art results on a diverse array of downstream natural language processing (NLP) tasks. Nonetheless, little attention has been paid to the interpretability and transferability of continuous prompts. Faced with the challenges, we investigate the feasibility of interpreting continuous prompts as the weighting of discrete prompts by jointly optimizing prompt fidelity and downstream fidelity. Our experiments show that: (1) one can always find a combination of discrete prompts as the replacement of continuous prompts that performs well on downstream tasks; (2) our interpretable framework faithfully reflects the reasoning process of source prompts; (3) our interpretations provide effective readability and plausibility, which is helpful to understand the decision-making of continuous prompts and discover potential shortcuts. Moreover, through the bridge constructed between continuous prompts and discrete prompts using our interpretations, it is promising to implement the cross-model transfer of continuous prompts without extra training signals. We hope this work will lead to a novel perspective on the interpretations of continuous prompts.